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A THIRD-PARTY CLAIMANT BECOMES AN INSURED:
HOVET V. ALLSTATE AND THE EXPANDING RIGHT
TO SUE UNDER NEW MEXICO'S INSURANCE CODE
THOMAS GIORDANO-LASCARI"
I. INTRODUCTION
Hovet v. Allstate Insurance Co.' came before the New Mexico Supreme Court
as a result of two different automobile accidents involving different parties.2 In each
of these cases, Allstate, the defendants' insurance company, failed to offer an
adequate settlement amount despite admissions of guilt by their clients.3 As a result,
the plaintiffs filed an action against Allstate alleging a violation of the unfair claims
practices provision of the New Mexico Insurance Code. While New Mexico courts
had held, prior to Hovet, that insurance providers could be joined as a party to an
action, 4 the courts had not held that third-party claimants had a private cause of
action against an insurer.
The court in Hovet ultimately decided to extend the right to bring a private cause
of action for a violation of the unfair claims practices section of the Insurance Code
to third-party claimants. 5 Prior to Hovet, it was believed that an unfair claims action
could only be brought by a first-party policyholder.6 While allowing for any private
cause of action under the unfair claims practices section of the Insurance Code
already made New Mexico different from most other states, the Hovet opinion
further separated New Mexico from the majority of jurisdictions that have dealt
with this issue.7
This Note analyzes the reasoning behind the Hovet opinion8 as well as the case
law that led to the holding.9 Further, this Note analyzes California's attempt at
instituting a similar cause of action and the effects that holding had on California.'°
This Note concludes with possible implications that may arise in the wake of the
Hovet ruling."
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Since 1868, the insurance industry has been exclusively within the province of
state regulation.' 2 However, in 1944, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the insurance

* Class of 2006, University of New Mexico School of Law. I want to thank my faculty advisor, Maureen
Sanders, for all her help and encouragement, Professor Ted Occhialino and Michael Wilson for their insightful
suggestions, and my family for their love and support.
1. 2004-NMSC-010, 89 P.3d 69.
2. Id. 1 2-8, 89 P.3d at 71-72.
3. See id.U2, 5, 89P.3dat71.
4. See infra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
5. Hovet, 2004-NMSC-010, 1, 89 P.3d at 71.
6. See, e.g., Hovet v. Lujan, 2003-NMCA-061, 1 6, 66 P.3d 980,982 (demonstrating the district court's
belief that a private cause of action by a third party did not exist in New Mexico).
7. See Hovet, 2004-NMSC-010, 1 12, 89 P.3d at 73.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part II.B-D.
10. See infra Part V.B.
11. See infra Part VI.
12. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868) (holding that insurance is not "commerce" within the
meaning of the Commerce Clause), overruledin partby United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322
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industry was subject to the application of antitrust statutes, thus opening the door
for potential federal regulation. 3 This prompted the insurance industry to lobby
Congress to pass the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 4 The federal statute "provided a
three-year moratorium on federal regulation of the insurance industry [and] [a]t the
end of the moratorium the federal regulators could then assert their authority only
over those aspects of the insurance industry not regulated by the states."' 5
During this moratorium, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) drafted a model act that delegated broad power to state insurance
commissioners in an attempt to preempt future federal regulation (Model Act).' 6
The Model Act also defined and prohibited unfair and deceptive practices in the
insurance industry.'7 Subsequent amendments to the Model Act broadened the
scope of its unfair and deceptive practices section. 8 Most states eventually adopted
a version of the NAIC's Model Act and codified, within their insurance code, an
unfair and deceptive practices provision.' 9
However, the Model Act promulgated by the NAIC and adopted by a majority
of the states did not grant a private cause of action to an insured or third-party
claimant for violations of the unfair and deceptive practices provision.2" For those
states wishing to extend a private right of action, the drafting note to the Model Act
states, "A jurisdiction choosing to provide for a private cause of action should
consider a different statutory scheme. This Act is inherently inconsistent with a
private cause of action. This is merely a clarification of original intent and not
indicative of any change of position.",2' Thus, the NAIC, in drafting the Model Act,
intended an exclusive grant of power to state insurance commissioners to
investigate violations of the unfair and deceptive practices section of the insurance
code and to impose penalties accordingly.22 Therefore, the issue of whether or not
a private cause of action exists turns on the particular state's insurance code and an
interpretation of the state's unfair and deceptive practices provision.
The majority of jurisdictions that have adopted the NAIC's Model Act have
declined to extend a private cause of action to insureds or to third-party claimants.23
The insurance codes in those jurisdictions are similar to the Model Act in that they
vest exclusive power to the state insurance commissioner to investigate and impose
penalties for violations of unfair claims practices. 24 However, a minority of
jurisdictions has found a right to a private cause of action either by an explicit
U.S. 533 (1944); see also STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACIONS: LIABILITY& DAMAGES § 9:02, at 9-3 (2d ed.

1997).

13. South-Eastern UnderwritersAss 'n, 322U.S. at 560-61 (1944); see also ASHLEY, supranote 12, §9:02,

at 9-3.
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2000); see ASHLEY, supra note 12, § 9:02, at 9-3 to 9-4.
15. ASHLEY, supranote 12, § 9:02, at 9-4 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012(b), 1013(a) (2000)).
16. Id.
17. Id. (citing NAIC MODEL UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT § 4(9) (1991) [hereinafter NAIC MODEL
ACT]).

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
See id.
Id. § 9:03, at 9-8.
NAIC MODEL ACT, supra note 17, § 1.
See ASHLEY, supra note 12, § 9:03, at 9-8.
See id. §9:03, at 9-10 n.39 (enumerating jurisdictions and relevant citations).
See id. (citing states that have rejected a private cause of action).
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enactment by the state legislature25 or by inferring such from legislative silence.2 6
Of these minority jurisdictions, only a few have extended a private cause of action
to a third-party claimant," while most only allow the policyholder to bring an unfair
claims action against the insurer.28 The State of New Mexico had not decided this
issue until it was presented to the New Mexico Supreme Court in Hovet.
A. The New Mexico Insurance Code
In 1984, the New Mexico Legislature enacted the current Insurance Code.29
Article 16 of the Insurance Code contains a section on unfair and deceptive claims
practices.3 ° The legislature modeled this section of the Insurance Code after the
NAIC's Model Act. 3' Although based on the Model Act, various changes and
additions make New Mexico's code different from the Model Act, as well as from
most other jurisdictions.3 2
The purpose of the unfair claims practices section of the New Mexico Insurance
Code is to regulate certain practices in the insurance industry by defining actions
or practices that are considered unfair or deceptive acts or practices.33 In order to
achieve this purpose, New Mexico chose to enact certain sections of its Insurance
Code that differed substantially from the Model Act.34 The most notable addition
was section 59A- 16-30, which grants a cause of action to "[a]ny person covered by
Chapter 59A, Article 16 NMSA 1978 who has suffered damages as a result of a
violation of that article."35 While the Model Act contemplated that state insurance
commissioners would have the exclusive power to investigate and proscribe
penalties for unfair claims practices, New Mexico explicitly granted a private cause
of action through the codification of section 59A-16-30.
New Mexico also changed the wording in certain subsections of its unfair claims
practices section. The Model Act uses the words "claims" and "claimants"

25. See id. § 9:03, at 9-10 n.38 (enumerating jurisdictions and relevant citations).
26. See, e.g., Hovet, 2004-NMSC-010, 11, 89 P.3d at 72.
27. See, e.g., Klaudt v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 658 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Mont. 1983) (holding that
a cause of action for failure to settle exists to a third-party claimant under the unfair trade practices section of the
insurance code); Jenkins v. J.C. Penny Cas. Ins. Co., 280 S.E.2d 252, 256-58 (W. Va. 1981) (holding that there
exists a cause of action to a third-party claimant for a defendant's insurance company's violation of unfair trade
practices)) overruledon other grounds by State ex rel. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Madden, 451 S.E.2d 721 (W.
Va. 1994).
28. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson, 468 S.E.2d 495,497 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that only an insured,
or one in privity with the insured, may bring a cause of action for unfair trade practices); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watson
876 S.W.2d 145, 147 (Tex. 1994) (declining to recognize a third-party claimant's right to bring a cause of action
against a defendant's insurer for violation of unfair trade practices).
29. Insurance Code, ch. 127, §§ 1-988, 1984 N.M. Laws.
30. NMSA 1978, § 59A-16-20 (1997).
31. Hovel, 2004-NMSC-010, 11, 89 P.3d at 72; see also NAIC Model Act, supranote 17, § 4.
32. See, e.g., Scroggins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 393 N.E.2d 718, 721-23 (11. App. Ct. 1979) (refusing to
recognize a third-party claimant's standing to sue for violation of unfair trade practices); Herrig v. Herrig, 844 P.2d
487, 493-94 (Wyo. 1992) (refusing to extend a private action to a third-party claimant). Compare NMSA 1978,
§ 59A-16-30 (1990) with 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/154.6 (1997), and WYo. STAT. ANN. § 26-13-124 (1986).
33. NMSA 1978, § 59A-1 6-2 (1984). Such unfair or deceptive acts are defined in NMSA 1978, § 59A-1620(1997).
34. See Hovet, 2004-NMSC-010, 1 11, 89 P.3d at 72.
35. NMSA 1978, § 59A-16-30 (1990).
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throughout its definition of unfair claims practices.3 6 The New Mexico Legislature,
however, inserted the word "insured" before the word "claims" in defining certain
unfair claims practices within section 59A-16-20." 7 Thus, the interpretation of the
New Mexico Insurance Code becomes more difficult; New Mexico courts cannot
rely completely on the guidelines set forth by the NAIC because the affirmative
changes by the New Mexico Legislature show an intent to depart from certain
provisions of the Model Act. Therefore, the courts are left to speculate as to why
certain provisions of the New Mexico Insurance Code were altered or included and
are forced to interpret these clauses with little guidance.
B. Russell's Intended Beneficiary Analysis
Russell v. Protective Insurance Co.3" was a case decided shortly after the
codification of the new Insurance Code in New Mexico where the court interpreted
the new additions of the Insurance Code in relation to the Workers' Compensation
Act. 39 There, Russell alleged "that respondent, Protective Insurance Company...,
had refused 'to attempt in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair and equitable
settlement of [his workers' compensation] claim.'" 4 The court was forced to decide
the applicability of the unfair claims and practices section of the Insurance Code to
the Workers' Compensation Act.4 Two cases decided prior to the codification of
the Insurance Code, Dickson v. Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co.42 and
Gonzalez v. UnitedStates Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 43 denied workers the right to
bring a private cause of action against their companies' insurers for bad-faith
dealings with workers.' However, in light of the codification of the new Insurance
Code in 1984, the court was asked to decide if the new enactment extended a private
right of action to workers against their employer's compensation insurers.45

36. See, e.g., NAIC MODEL ACT, supra note 17, § 4(D) (defining unfair claims practices as "[n]ot
attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlement of claims submitted in which liability
has become reasonably clear") (emphasis added).
37. See NMSA 1978, § 59A-16-20(E) (1997) ("not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and
equitable settlements of an insured'sclaims in which liability has become reasonably clear") (emphasis added);
id § 59A-16-20(G) (1997) ("compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under policy by
offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered") (emphasis added); id § 59A- 16-20(K) (1997)
("making known to insureds or claimants a practice of insurer of appealing from arbitration awards in favor of
insuredsor claimants")(emphasis added); id. § 59A-16-20(L) (1997) ("delaying the investigation or payment of
claims by requiring an insured, claimant or the physician of either to submit a preliminary claim report")
(emphasis added).
38. 107 N.M. 9, 751 P.2d 693 (1988).
39. id.

40. Id. at 10, 751 P.2d at 694 (quoting NMSA 1978, § 59A- 16-20(E) (1984) (alteration in original)).
41. NMSA 1978, §§ 52-1-1 to -70 (2003).
42. 98 N.M. 479, 650 P.2d 1 (1982).
43. 99 N.M. 432, 659 P.2d 318 (Ct. App. 1983).
44. See Dickson, 98 N.M. at 481, 650 P.2d at 3 ("[I]f the compensation act provides a remedy for the
alleged wrong, then that remedy is exclusive." (citing Russell, 107 N.M. at 12, 751 P.2d at 696)); Gonzales, 99
N.M. at 434, 659 P.2d at 320 (holding that "a workman had no independent cause of action against an insurer who
allegedly acted in bad faith by attempting to coerce the workman into accepting an unfavorable compensation
settlement" (citing Russell, 107 N.M. at 12, 751 P.2d at 696)); see also Russell, 107 N.M. at 10-11, 751 P.2d at
694-95.
45. Russell, 107 N.M. at 11, 751 P.2d at 695.
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Russell contended that the new unfair claims and practices provision "implicitly
amended the Workers' Compensation Act by allowing a cause of action against
46
'
compensation insurers for bad faith refusal to pay compensation benefits." Protective argued that the legislature's use of the word "insured" in section 59A- 16-20
manifested its intent to only extend a private cause of action to the policyholder and
not the third-party claimant.47 The court found Protective's interpretation of the
code too narrow and turned its analysis on who was an intended beneficiary of the
insurance policy:
It is clear that the law today has moved drastically away from the strict
limitations of privity of contract which the respondents would impose in this
case. The law has expanded on many fronts to the point where third-parties who
have made no formal contractual obligation with either the promisor or promisee
are nonetheless capable of asserting standing as beneficiaries to the
to a contract
48
contract.
The court ultimately concluded that Russell was a third-party beneficiary of his
employer's insurance policy and granted Russell a private right of action under the
Insurance Code against his employer's insurer when the insurer intentionally
refused to pay compensation benefits.49
Russell established precedent for the court to interpret the Insurance Code to
extend a private right of action to third parties by looking to the intended beneficiaries under the Workers' Compensation Act. The court in Hovet, relying on
Russell as precedent, then had to determine if the general public was an intended
beneficiary of compulsory automobile insurance policies under the Mandatory
Financial Responsibility Act.
C. The New Mexico Mandatory FinancialResponsibilityAct
The Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act (MFRA), ° passed by the New
Mexico Legislature in 1978, is not part of the Insurance Code. The MFRA is a
separate set of statutes requiring compulsory insurance for the operation of
automobiles. 5 ' The purpose of the MFRA as defined in the statute states:
The legislature is aware that motor vehicle accidents in New Mexico can result
in catastrophic financial hardship. The purpose of the Mandatory Financial
Responsibility Act is to require residents of New Mexico who own and operate
motor vehicles upon the highways of the state either to have the ability to
respond in damages to accidents arising out of the use and operation of a motor
vehicle or to obtain a motor vehicle insurance policy.52

46. Id.
47. Id. at 13, 751 P.2d at 697.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 12, 14, 751 P.2d at 696, 698. The court in Russell noted that the private cause of action did not
extend to an "insurer's negligent or dilatory failure to pay benefits." Id. at 12, 751 P.2d at 696.
50. The Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act, ch. 35, § 277, 1978 N.M. Laws (codified at NMSA 1978,
§ 66-5-201 to -239 (2003)).
51. NMSA 1978, § 66-5-201 to-239 (2003).
52. NMSA 1978, § 66-5-201.1 (1998).
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Thus, the MFRA enumerated certain statutory provisions to effectuate the purpose
of making those who use automobiles financially able to deal with the damages
arising from automobile accidents. 3 The most important provision of the MFRA is
its requirement that an owner of an automobile be insured or otherwise demonstrate
financial responsibility. 4 The statute further provides requirements for the
insurance policy." Specifically, the policy shall "insure the person named in the
policy...against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of
the ownership, maintenance or use of the motor vehicle within a jurisdiction."56
Important to the New Mexico Supreme Court in Hovet was whether or not
insurance policies under the MFRA were created for the benefit of the general
public. Using the intended beneficiary analysis in Russell, 7 if a policy is found to
be for the benefit of the public, then the traditional notions of privity of contract are
negated,5 8 and those who are intended beneficiaries of the insurance policy become
"insureds" within the meaning of the unfair claims practices section of the
Insurance Code.59 Thus, the court in Hovet had to examine the MFRA and its
progeny to determine if compulsory liability insurance contemplated the general
public as intended beneficiaries of an insurance policy and, therefore, as an
"insured" within the meaning of the Insurance Code.
D. The MFRA Case Law
Even prior to the enactment of the MFRA, the New Mexico Supreme Court in
Breeden v. Wilson60 held that "an insurance policy procured by force of legislative
enactment inures to the benefit of any injured member of the public."'" This
interpretation remained consistent in post-MFRA cases beginning with Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Jensen.62 The court in Jensen interpreted the omnibus clause of the
MFRA.63 The court concluded that "the omnibus clause of the Allstate liability
policy must provide coverage to any person using the insured vehicle with the
owner's consent, without regard to any restrictions or understanding between the
parties on the particular use for which the permission was given.""M In so finding,
the court in Jensen looked to the MFRA and its policies. The court stated that the
"legislative purpose [of the MFRA] reflects the view that the required automobile
liability insurance is for the benefit of the public generally, innocent victims of

53. See NMSA 1978, § 66-5-205 (1998).
54. Id.
55. See id. § 66-5-205.3 (2003).
56. Id.§ 66-5-205.3(A)(2) (2003).
57. 107 N.M. 9, 751 P.2d 693, 697 (1988).
58. See Hovet, 2004-NMSC-010, 17,89 P.3d at 74.
59. See id.
60. 58 N.M. 517, 273 P.2d 376 (1954).
61. Id. at 524, 273 P.2d at 380.
62. 109 N.M. 584, 788 P.2d 340 (1990).
63. The onibus clause of the MFRA extends the insurance policy mandated by the MFRA to cover drivers
given permission by the policyholder to drive the automobile. See NMSA 1978, § 66-5-205.3 (2003) (providing
that an insurance policy shall "insure the person named in the policy and a person using any such motor vehicle
with the express or implied permission of the named insured"). The court in Jensen interpreted an essentially
identical clause in the MFRA, which was later repealed. See Jensen, 109 N.M. at 585-86, 788 P.2d at 341-42.
64. Jensen, 109 N.M. at 587, 788 P.2d at 343.
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automobile accidents, as well as the insured."65 Thus, Jensen declared that an
insurer cannot rely on insurance policies with clauses inconsistent with those in the
MFRA.66 In doing so, Jensen further demonstrated the court's understanding that
insurance under the MFRA was for the public's benefit and must be given broad
interpretation to effectuate the purpose of the MFRA.
Based on the perception of the MFRA as a public benefit, the court in Raskob v.
Sanchez67 allowed an injured party to join the tortfeasor's insurance company in a
negligence action arising out of an automobile accident where mandatory liability
insurance was required. Raskob sued the tortfeasors and joined the insurer in the
same action, arguing that the MFRA allowed this direct claim against the insurer.68
The New Mexico Supreme Court reviewed the MFRA and its purpose, specifically
quoting Jensen.6 9 While the court noted that the insurance company generally is
only in privity with an injured party by a contract or statute,7 ° the court found that
when an insurance policy is mandated by law for the protection of the public, the
insurer is a proper party to a claim for damages by an injured third party so long as
no law prohibits the joinder.7
The court in Raskob further found that there was no express language in the
MFRA negating a joinder of an insurer to a claim for damages by an injured third
party.72 Allstate, however, had argued that the MFRA implicitly prohibited joinder
of an insurer because the legislature intended the insurance policy mandated by the
MFRA to be for indemnification, which can only occur after a final judgment of
liability.73 Under this reasoning, liability would first have to be decided at trial
before Allstate could become a party.74
The court disagreed with Allstate's reasoning, finding that compulsory liability
insurance differs from an indemnification policy in that compulsory insurance is
intended to benefit the general public, while indemnification is solely for the benefit
of the insured.75 Thus, the court distinguished an insurer's liability to pay, which
occurs after a judgment, with a plaintiff's right to bring suit against an insurer.7 6 In
conclusion, the court stated, "plaintiff's right to sue Allstate became absolute when
the accident occurred and the Plaintiff was injured."77
Thus, the court in Raskob further defined the MFRA and its purpose. The
decision allowed forj oinder of an insurer in a negligence claim when the insurance

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 1998-NMSC-045, 970 P.2d 580.
68. Id. 1 1, 970 P.2d at 580. The version of the MFRA interpreted in this case was prior to the 1998
amendments. The pre-1998 purpose was very similar to the purpose statement quoted above with the addition of
the sentence: "It is the intent that the risks and financial burdens of motor vehicle accidents be equitably distributed
among all owners and operators of motor vehicles within the state." See id. 2, 970 P.2d at 580-81 (quoting
NMSA 1978, § 66-5-201.1 (1983) (amended 1998)).
69. 109 N.M. 584, 788 P.2d 340 (1990); see infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
70. Raskob, 1998-NMSC-045, 3,970 P.2d at 581.
71. Id.
72. Id. 14, 970 P.2d at 581.
73. Id. 5, 970 P.2d at 581.
74. Id.
75. Id. 6, 970 P.2d at 581-82.
76. Id. (citing Lopez v. Townsend, 37 N.M. 574, 583-84, 25 P.2d 809, 813-14 (1933)).
77. Id.
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is mandated by law and defined the insurance policy as for the benefit of the public
78
rather than an indemnification policy between the insurer and the policyholder.
Thus, the MFRA has been broadly interpreted to benefit the public in general, rather
than the specific policyholder.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Hovet v. Allstate InsuranceCo.79 arose from two petitions for certiori by Allstate
after the New Mexico Court of Appeals ruled that third-party claimants could
maintain an action against Allstate under section 59A-16-30 for violations of
section 59A-16-20 of the Insurance Code. 0
A. FirstPetition
Jane Hovet brought the first of these cases against Steven Lujan, Arthur Lujan,
and their insurer, Allstate, in a negligence action that stemmed from an automobile
accident in March of 1995.8 Hovet was injured and incurred medical expenses in
excess of $11,000.82 The Lujans "conceded.liability for all of Hovet's damages
proximately caused by the collision, [yet] Allstate's highest settlement offer before
trial was only $7,200. "83 After the Lujans' admission of liability at a hearing for
summary judgment, Hovet added another claim against Allstate for failure to make
a good faith effort in settling her claims. 4 Hovet relied on section 59A-16-20(E) of
the Trade Practices and Fraud Article of the Insurance Code.85 At trial, the district
court bifurcated Hovet's negligence claim against the Lujans from her unfair
practices claim against Allstate. 6 At the conclusion of the negligence action in July
2000, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Hovet for $62,050.87 However, at the
later trial for the unfair practices claim, the district court dismissed Hovet's claim
with prejudice stating that the Insurance Code does not grant relief to a third-party
claimant of an automobile liability insurance policy.8 Hovet appealed to the New
Mexico Court of Appeals, which held that a third-party claimant has "a
claim... under the unfair claims practices provisions of the Insurance Code."89
B. Second Petition
The second petition for certiori presented to the New Mexico Supreme Court in
Hovet arose from another automobile accident. There, Maritza Reynoso and her son
78. Id.
79. 2004-NMSC-010, 89 P.3d 69.
80. Id. if 1-8, 89 P.3d at 70-72.
81. 1d.12, 88 r.3u at 7 1. I vYC
li-tiaflly
UcgL
..... te .ia...ai.
her complaint to include Allstate as a co-defendant. Id.

....

w

dI

;

--buta,.
l lat amended

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See id.It 1-2,89 P.3d at 70-71; see also NMSA 1978, § 59A-16-20(E) (1997) (providing that it is an
unfair and deceptive practice to "not attempt[] in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements
of an insured's claims in which liability has become reasonably clear").
86. Hovet, 2004-NMSC-010, 13, 89 P.3d at 71.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Hovet v. Lujan, 2003-NMCA-061, 1,66 P.3d 980, 981.
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were involved in an automobile collision with Laura Waller.9 ° Allstate, Waller's
insurer, offered to settle Reynoso's medical claims for $3,000. 9' Reynoso and her
son's combined medical expenses were $5,410.92 After Allstate refused to increase
its settlement offer, Reynoso brought a negligence claim against Waller, and an
unfair practices claim against Allstate.93 Similar to the district court's hearing of
Hovet's claims, the court bifurcated the negligence claim from the unfair practices
claim.9 4 Waller conceded liability but denied that she proximately caused all of the
damages.95 The jury eventually returned a verdict for Reynoso in the amount of
$7,180 and for her son in the amount of $1,520.96 However, in March of 2002, the
district court dismissed the claims against Allstate, again reasoning that a thirdparty claimant did not have a private cause of action under the Insurance Code.97
Reynoso appealed this decision to the court of appeals, which reversed relying on
its holding in Lujan, and a private cause of action under the Insurance Code was
extended to Reynoso.98
C. Hovet v. Lujan
Of the two petitions, Hovet v. Lujan99 was the first case to come before the New
Mexico Court of Appeals. There, Judge Alarid, writing for a unanimous majority,
held that the Insurance Code extended a private cause of action to a third-party
claimant for unfair claims practices. I0 In so holding, the court of appeals refused
to extend a third-party claimant's right to sue under the MFRA and its progeny, but
rather held that such a right existed under the Insurance Code. 0''
The court concluded that an insurer and a third party are not required to settle
under the MFRA, despite the plaintiff's argument to the contrary. 0 2 The court found
no suggestion that "the Legislature intended the [MFRA] to alter the adversarial,
fault-based system ofrecovery."' 0 3 Therefore, Allstate only had a common law duty
to settle, in good faith, a claim made by an insured and not the adversary of the
policyholder."° Hovet, however, argued that Raskob v. Sanchez 15 recognized a
third-party beneficiary relationship between an insurer and a claimant under the

90. Hover, 2004-NMSC-010, 5, 89 P.3d at 71.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. 6, 89 P.3d at 71.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. 7, 89 P.3d at 72.
98. Id.
99. 2003-NMCA-061, 66 P.3d 980.
100. Id.H 1, 26, 66 P.3d at 981, 986.
101. See id. 27, 66 P.3d at 986.
102. Id.It 15-18, 66 P.3d at 983-84.
103. Id. 15, 66 P.3d at 983 (citing Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 307 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Wis.
1981) (noting that, absent a contractual relationship, there exists no cause of action for a tort victim for bad faith
settlement)).
104. Id. 16, 66 P.3d at 983 (citing Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Herman, 1998-NMSC-005,
12-15, 954 P.2d
56,61 (discussing the duty to settle in good faith and its rationale); O.K. Lumber Co. v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co.,
759 P.2d 523, 526 (Alaska 1998) (holding an insurer has an obligation only to the insured to settle in good faith)).
105. 1998-NMSC-045, 970 P.2d 580.
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MFRA, thus making Hovet, in essence, an "insured" entitled to protection under the
policy.1" 6
The court of appeals in Lujan, however, noted that Raskob specifically
distinguished between liability to pay and the right to bring suit.'0 7 Along the
Raskob line of cases, the MFRA allows a plaintiff to secure a judgment against the
insurer for payment in the underlying negligence action.1 8 However, neither Raskob
nor the MFRA intended to allow a private right of action to a third-party claimant
against the insurer for not effectuating a good faith settlement.'0 9
After rejecting that a third-party cause of action existed under the MFRA, the
court looked to the Insurance Code."0 Allstate pointed out that subsections 59A- 1620(K) and (L) of the Insurance Code specifically refer to "claimants,""' while
subsection 59A-16-20(E) only refers to "insured.""' 2 Thus, Allstate argued, the
legislature intended "insured" to mean a first-party policyholder." 3 Further, Amicus
New Mexico Defense Lawyers' Association argued that the legislature
was fully aware of the problem of the use of abusive claims settlement practices
against third-party claimants, but that the Legislature's answer to this public
policy question was to authorize the Superintendent to "strip an abusive insurer
of the right to do business in New Mexico" rather than to create a private cause
of action in favor of third-party claimants."'
However, the court was ultimately persuaded by Hovet's counterargument that
Russell v. ProtectiveInsurance Co. should govern the case." 5
The New Mexico Court of Appeals noted that Russell was decided in the context
of workers' compensation insurance rather than automobile insurance;" 16 however,
the court found that
the absence of any discussion of the unique character of the workers' compensation system, coupled with the emphasis given Article Sixteen of the Insurance
Code, indicates to us that our Supreme Court's third-party beneficiary analysis

106. Lujan, 2003-NMCA-061, 17, 66 P.3d at 984.
107. Id.
108. Id.(analogizingRaskob to Rule 1-0 14(A) NMRA, "which authorizes a defendant to join as a third-party
defendant a person 'who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him"').
109. Id. %117-18,66 P.3d at 984.
110. Id. 20-26, 66 P.3d at 984-85.
111. See NMSA 1978, § 59A-16-20(K) (1997) (defining an unfair claims practice as "making known to
insureds or claimants" a practice of appealing arbitration awards favorable to the insured or claimant); id. § 59A16-20(L) (1997) (defining an unfair claims practice as "delaying the investigation or payment of claims by
requiring an insured, claimant or the physician of either to submit" duplicative proof of lost forms).
112. Lujan, 2003-NMCA-061, 22, 66 P.3d at 985; see NMSA 1978, § 59A-16-20(E) (1997) (prohibiting
an insurer from "not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of an insured's
claims"); see also supra note 37 and accompanying text.
113. Lujan, 2003-NMCA-061, 122,66 P.3d at 985.
114. Id. 23, 66 P.3d at 985; see NMSA 1978, § 59A-5-26(C)(2) (1997) (authorizing superintendent to
suspend or revoke an insurer's certificate of authority for failing to pay or delay paying claims in favor of an
insured or a third party).
115. Lujan, 2003-NMCA-061,
24-26, 66 P.3d at 985-86; see also Russell, 107 N.M. 9,751 P.2d 693
(1988).
116. Lujan, 2003-NMCA-061, 25, 66 P.3d at 986.
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was not dependent on the plaintiff's status as a workers' compensation
claimant." 7
Therefore, the court of appeals found the interpretation of the Insurance Code in
Russell controlling and declined to adopt Allstate's argument." 8 Thus, the court
held that Hovet did not have a claim for unfair trade practices against Allstate under
the MFRA; however, she did have a claim under the Insurance Code." 9
Following the New Mexico Court of Appeal's decision in Lujan, Allstate filed
an appeal to the New Mexico Supreme Court. While this appeal was pending,
Reynoso brought her claim to the court of appeals on the same issue.' 20 Relying on
their opinion in Lujan, the court of appeals, in a memorandum opinion, also
extended a private cause of action to Reynoso. 12 1 Again, Allstate appealed this
the supreme court consolidated with Allstate's appeal from the
judgment, which
22
Lujan ruling.1
IV. RATIONALE
The issue presented to the New Mexico Supreme Court in Hovel v. Allstate
Insurance Co. 123 was "whether third-party claimants of automobile liability
insurance policies have a statutory cause of action under the Insurance Code when
the liability insurer fails to make good-faith efforts to settle the underlying
claim.' ' 124 In a 4-1 decision, the New Mexico Supreme Court answered the question
affirmatively.
A. The Majority'sPosition
The majority opinion in Hovet, authored by Justice Bosson, based its analysis on
the statutory interpretation of sections 59A-16-20 and 59A-16-30 of the Trade
Practices and Frauds Article of the Insurance Code.12 5 The court applied "the
guiding principle of statutory construction.. .that a statute should be interpreted in
a manner consistent with legislative intent."'' 2 6 In order to discern the legislative
statute, but also to
intent, the court "look[ed] not only to the language used in the
27
the purpose to be achieved and the wrong to be remedied."'
1. Legislative Intent
The majority began its analysis by noting the minority view the New Mexico
Insurance Code adopted and the legislature's partial departure from the National

117. Id.
118. See id. 26, 66 P.3d at 986.
119. Id. 27, 66 P.3d at 986.
120. See Hovet v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2004-NMSC-010, 7, 89 P.3d 69, 72.
121. Id.
122. Id. 8, 89 P.3d at 72.
123. 2004-NMSC-010, 89 P.3d 69.
124. Id. 8, 89 P.3d at 72.
125. See id. 9, 89 P.3d at 72.
126. Id. 9 10, 89 P.3d at 72 (citing State ex rel.Newsome v. Alarid, 90 N.M. 790, 794, 568 P.2d 1236, 1240
(1977)).
127. Id. (citing State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 117 N.M. 346, 353, 871 P.2d 1352, 1359 (1994); Miller
v. N.M. Dep't of Transp., 106 N.M. 253, 254, 741 P.2d 1374, 1375 (1987)).
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Association of Insurance Commissioners' Model Act.'2 8 Specifically, the court
recognized New Mexico's addition of a private right of action against insurers.' 29
Thus, from the language of the statutes, the court tried to discern the legislature's
intent when it enacted sections 59A-16-20 and 59A-16-30. 3 ° To do so, the court
looked at Russell and the interpretation provided with respect to the legislative
intent of those sections. 131
The court in Hovet was particularly interested in the third-party beneficiary
analysis found in Russell.132 Russell held that
the Legislature "intended to expand" the "traditional notion of 'insured' to
include employees who were intended beneficiaries of the insurance policy. By
virtue of being an intended beneficiary, the employee.. .became a statutory
"insured," to whom the insurer owed a duty of fair settlement practices as
described in the Insurance Code.133
Based on the holding in Russell,the majority concluded that the legislature intended
to extend a private cause of action under section 59A-16-30 to third-party
claimants. 34 The court gave particular significance to the words "any person" used
in section 59A-16-30.1 35 These words led the court to infer that the legislature meant
36
to extend recovery to third-party claimants and first-party policyholders equally. 1
In creating a separate statutory action, the legislature had the remedial purpose of
encouraging ethical claims practices within the insurance industry in mind.33 The
private right of action was one means toward that end.33 Thus, the court felt that "if
a third-party is injured by one of the enumerated unfair claims practices, that party
protection, as defined by
is no less a 'person' falling within the ambit of legislative
139
the remedial purposes the legislature envisioned.'
However, Allstate emphasized that the Model Act used the words "claims" and
"claimants" throughout the definition of unfair claims practices, while the New
Mexico Legislature inserted the word "insured" before the word "claims" in section
59A- 16-20(E).140 Therefore, Allstate argued, the deliberate change "indicate[d] that
the Legislature only intended to provide 'insureds' with a private right of action for
violations of the unfair claims practices section, at least with respect to reasonable

128. Id. 1 11, 89 P.3d at 72; see supra Part II.A.
129. Hovet, 2004-NMSC-010, 1 11, 89 P.3d at 72.
130. See id. 13-14, 89 P.3d at 73.
131. See supra Part H.B.
132. Hover, 2004-NMSC-010, 13, 89 P.3d at 73; see supra Part H.B.
133. Hovet, 2004-NMSC-010, 16, 89 P.3d at 74 (quoting Russell v. Protective Ins. Co., 107 N.M. 9, 13,
751 P.2d 693, 697 (1988)) (citation omitted).
134. Id. 113, 89 P.3d at 73.
135. "Any person covered by [article 16] who has suffered damages as a result of a violation of that article
by an insurer or agent is granted a right to bring an action in district court to recover actual damages." NMSA 1978,
§ 59A-16-30 (1990).
136. Hovet, 2004-NMSC-010,1 14, 89 P.3d at 73.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140.

See id.

15, 89 P.3d at 73-74; see also NMSA 1978, § 59A-16-20(E) (1997) (defining an unfair claim

practice as "not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of an insured'sclaims
in which liability has become reasonably clear") (emphasis added).
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efforts to settle 'an insured's claims."""' According to Allstate, under this more
narrow interpretation, the phrase "any person" used under section 59A-16-30
references the "insured" under section 59A-16-20. 142 The court was not persuaded
it was the same argument that had previously been
by this argument because
143
rejected in Russell.
2. Public Policy
The court instead looked to who the intended beneficiaries of automobile liability
insurance were, as well as the public policy behind the MFRA. 1" In examining
public policy, the court noted that, in the majority of claims made under an
automobile liability policy, the insurer would be settling the claims of a third-party
claimant.1 45 Therefore, these policies often incorporate more than just the
policyholder and the insurer, differentiating them from an indemnity policy that is
usually in the context of solely the insured and the insurer.'" The court found it to
be
illogical to conclude that a third-party claimant with a direct interest in fair
settlement practices may not sue under the Insurance Code, while only the
insured, who may have little or no direct interest in settlement practices up to
policy limits, could sue. For most automobile liability policies, such an
the fair and equitable settlement
interpretation would render unenforceable
47
practices mandated by the Code. 1
The court further found that its holding was "consistent with the specific policy of
the New Mexico Mandatory Financial Responsibility Act," which mandates liability
insurance on those operating motor vehicles for the protection of the public. 48 The
court stated that "an insurance policy procured by force of legislative enactment
inures to the benefit of any injured member of the public.' 1 49 Accordingly, the court
in Hovet reasoned that the public policy behind compulsory automobile liability
insurance supported the conclusion that third parties are intended beneficiaries of
the insurance policies just as much as the policyholder. 5 ' Thus, the court held that
section 59A-16-30 extended to third parties a private cause of action against an
insurer.15

141. Hovet, 2004-NMSC-010, 15, 89 P.3d at 73-74.
142. See id.
143. See id. 16, 89 P.3d at 74; see also supra Part .B. (discussing the trend toward moving away from
traditional notions of privity of contract and instead adopting an intended beneficiary analysis).
17-19, 89 P.3d at 74-75; see also supra notes 72-78.
144. See Hovet, 2004-NMSC-010,
18, 89 P.3d at 74-75.
145. Hovet, 2004-NMSC-010,
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. 19, 89 P.3d at 75 (citing NMSA 1978, § 66-5-201 to -239).
149. Id. (quoting Breeden v. Wilson, 58 N.M. 517, 524, 273 P.2d 376, 380 (1954)); see also Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Jensen, 109 N.M. 584, 587, 788 P.2d 340, 343 (1990) (stating that compulsory automobile liability
insurance "is for the benefit of the public generally, innocent victims of automobile accidents, as well as the
insured").
150. Hovet, 2004-NMSC-010, 120, 89 P.3d at 75.
151. Id. 21, 89 P.3d at 75.
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3. Limitations
The court next used public policy considerations, as well as the text of the
Insurance Code, to impose several limitations on its holding.152 First, the court only
53
extended its holding to compulsory liability insurance mandated by the MFRA. 15 4
Thus, the question is still unanswered as to other types of compulsory insurance.
Second, the court "require[d] that any such action for unfair claims practices based
on failure to settle may only be filed after the conclusion of the underlying
negligence litigation, and after there has been a judicial determination of fault in
favor of the third party and against the insured."' 55 The court's imposition of this
limitation served to solve the potential confusion of the negligence action pending
simultaneously with the unfair claims practices action.156 The court reasoned that
this limitation would encourage settlement because it would bar any unfair claims
practices actions from being brought against the insurer if the parties settled.' 57
Also, in its discussion of limitations, the court declined to decide the issue of
whether punitive damages may be recovered from an unfair claims practices action
due to a lack of briefing on the issue. 5 While not necessarily a limitation on the
holding, the court's refusal to address this issue leaves room for a potential
limitation or expansion to be later formulated. The primary reason for the court's
hesitancy to decide this issue was that the unfair claims practices action is a
statutory cause of action as opposed to a common law cause of action and thus is
governed by the remedy provided for in the statute.' 59
With the imposition of these limitations, the court found that its holding was in
harmony with the legislature's intent by encouraging fair dealing with claimants and
insureds, as well as encouraging settlements so as to avoid potential litigation. 6
Thus, following Hovet, the New Mexico Insurance Code extends a private right of
action by a third-party claimant against an insurer for violation of the Trade
Practices and Frauds Article in MFRA compulsory insurance cases.
B. The Dissent'sPosition
In her dissent in Hovet, Judge Fry, sitting by designation, argued that the
legislature intended to treat claimants and insureds differently under the Insurance
Code. 16'The dissent noted that the majority's holding was contrary to the common
law and thus required extra scrutiny in the interpretation of legislative intent.'62
Judge Fry's position was similar to that of Allstate in that, by looking at article 16
as a whole, she found that the legislature used the words "claimants" or

i52. See id. 7 23-29, 89P.3dat 76-70.

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
damages,
160.
161.
162.

Id. 24, 89 P.3d at 76.
See id. 24 n.4, 89 P.3d at 76 n.4.
Id. 1 25, 89 P.3d at 76.
See id.
Id. 26, 89 P.3d at 76-77.
Id. 128, 89 P.3d at 77.
See id. (noting a federal court determined that section 59A-16-30 only provides for recovery of actual
costs, and attorney fees yet offering no opinion as to the weight of that decision).
See id. 30, 89 P.3d at 78.
See id. 33-41, 89 P.3d at 78-80.
Id. 1 34, 89 P.3d at 78.
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"beneficiaries" in only three of the subsections. 63
' Judge Fry's concern with the lack
of significance given to these distinctions by the majority was not alleviated by the
majority's justification that the "nature of automobile liability insurance, the
Court's decision in Russell, and the policy underlying the MFRA" indicated a
private cause of action for third-party claimants."
The dissent recognized the interest a third party has in an insurer's settlement
practices, but did not believe that translated to a legally enforceable right. 6 ' On the
contrary, Judge Fry found that the insured has a more significant role in the
settlement practices than the majority believed, thus negating the idea that the unfair
claims practices action would have little meaning if it did not extend to third-party
claimants.' 66
Judge Fry was also skeptical of the majority's interpretation of Russell.'67 She
contended that while the court's language in Russell was broad, the facts were
narrow and the holding should not be viewed outside ofthe Workers' Compensation
Act or extended to automobile liability insurance.'68 Therefore, she felt the
majority's reliance on Russell was misguided.'6 9
Lastly, Judge Fry did not see the need to go beyond the scope of the Insurance
Code to look at the MFRA. 7 ° In her view, the legislature's language made it clear
that there was to be a distinction between claimants and insureds, and therefore the
analysis of the MFRA was not needed. 7' Thus, the dissent believed that section
59A-16-20(E) gave only an insured a cause of action against an insurer.' 72
Furthermore, Judge Fry noted that there were already other safeguards adequately
protecting the interests of third-party claimants and, thus, it was unnecessary to
extend a private cause of action to these third-party claimants."'
V. ANALYSIS
Without specific legislative statements regarding the legislative intent in enacting
the unfair claims section of the Insurance Code, it is difficult to know whether the
legislature envisioned third-party claimants bringing a private cause of action
against insurers. While the court in Hovet did a thorough analysis of the public
policy behind compulsory automobile insurance to support its holding,'74 there exist
other valuable sources of possible legislative intent that were not addressed in the
163. Id. 1 35, 89 P.3d at 78-79 (citing NMSA 1978, § 59A-16-20(J)-(L) (1997)).
164. Id. 36, 89 P.3d at 79.
165. Id. 37, 89 P.3d at 79.
166. See id. (stating that the "insured's interest in avoiding protracted litigation and the stress of trial is as
tangible as the personal interest a claimant has in obtaining compensation"); see also id. 38, 89 P.3d at 79
(interpreting section 59A-16-20(E) as applying to more than liability insurance, thus resulting in a closer
relationship between the insured and the insurer).
167. See id. 39, 89 P.3d at 79.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. 140, 89 P.3d at 80.
171. Id.
172. Id. 41, 89 P.3d at 80.
173. Id. (noting the possibility of insurers having to pay a claimant's costs under Rule 1-068 NMRA,
prejudgment interest under NMSA 1978, § 56-8-4(B) (1993), and being subject to discipline by the superintendent
of insurance under § 59A-5-26(C)(2)(a) (1997)).
174. See supra Part IV.A.2.
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opinion-a proposed amendment to the unfair claims practices section of the
insurance code, 175 as well as an amendment to the Workers' Compensation Act that
legislatively overruled Russell.'76 Purporting to be bound by stare decisis, the court
in Hovet relied on the Russell opinion to bolster its holding.' 77 However, the stare
decisis concerns of the court do not alleviate the relevance of these omitted sources
of legislative intent.' 78 By addressing the possible importance of these sources, the
court in Hovet could have either reinforced its holding or possibly come out on the
opposite side of the argument. These sources are discussed below.
Further, whether or not the decision is a prudent one, it took many liberties with
precedent and legislative interpretation to support the policy behind it. The fact
remains that the court in Hovet extended a private right of action to a party that was
never explicitly recognized as possessing such a right. 179 The decision to extend a
private cause of action to a third-party claimant was not merely an interpretation of
an ambiguous clause, but a departure from almost every other jurisdiction that has
dealt with the question. Whether this is the interpretation the legislature originally
envisioned is speculation. However, assuming the decision was a proper
interpretation of the Insurance Code, the supreme court did craft its decision to
avoid many of the potential negative impacts that were seen in California's recent
attempt to extend a cause of action under its Insurance Code, which alleviates some
of the concerns over this departure.
A. Statutory Interpretationin Hovet
The court in Hovet used the precedent of Russell and the policy of the MFRA to
support its statutory analysis of the unfair trade practices section of the New Mexico
Insurance Code. 8 0 However, there are some omissions from the opinion that may
be valuable in further considering the legislature's intent to allow a third-party
claimant to bring a cause of action for violations of section 59A-16-20.
The first omission relates to a proposed amendment to the unfair trade practices
section of the Insurance Code. In 1999, the legislature proposed House Bill 314.18
The proposed act began with the title: "An Act Relating To Insurance; Extending
Coverage of Unfair Claims Practices by Insurance Companies to Third Party
Claimants; Increasing Damages; Providing for Attorney Fees and Costs."' 82 The
amendment would have modified the unfair trade practices section of the insurance
code by deleting the words83"insured" from the subsections and inserting the words
"claimants" or "claims."' The title, along with the change in language, may
support an inference that the current unfair claims practices section of the Insurance
Code does not extend a private cause of action to a third-party claimant. It is
difficult to assume that the legislature would need to amend the Insurance Code to
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See infra notes 181-188 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 189-192 and accompanying text.
See Hovel, 2004-NMSC-010, IN 13-17, 89 P.3d at 73-74.
See infra Part V.A.
See supra Part IV.
See Hovet, 2004-NMSC-010, 1 13-22, 89 P.3d at 73-76.
H.R. 314, 44th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 1999).
Id. at 1.
Id. at 2-4.
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extend coverage to a third-party claimant if it already existed. In a 53-13 vote, the
act failed to pass. 84
While no conclusive effect can be given to the proposed amendment and the
reason it did not pass New Mexico's House of Representatives, there is a valid
argument that the legislature was aware of the inability of a third-party claimant to
bring a cause of action against an insurer for unfair claims practices, but was not
prepared to extend the right to third-party claimants under the Insurance Code.
However, it is also possible that the legislators who voted against the amendment
already assumed the current statute extended to third-party claimants.
Under traditional methods of statutory construction, if a statute would be
unreasonable or inappropriate upon a literal reading, "not only do[es] [the court]
look to the language of the statute at hand, [it] also consider[s] the history and
background of the statute."' 85 To effectuate a strong rule of law consistent with the
actual legislative intent, it would have been prudent for the court to look at this
piece of legislative history. Although the court chose not to use the proposed
amendment in its statutory interpretation of the Insurance Code, it did use many
policy considerations of the MFRA to help structure its holding. 18 6 While it is
proper for the court to consider the policy implications of a statute when the statute
is ambiguous,18 7 it must be careful "not to sculpt the most just law possible out of
the words used by the Legislature or to attribute the meaning to a statute that
contemporary ideals would deem preferable."' 8 8
Another interesting omission from the Hovet opinion was that Russell had been
legislatively overruled.' 89 Subsequent to Russell, the legislature amended the
Workers' Compensation Act to add a remedy for bad-faith claims, thus taking that
remedy out of section 59A- 16-30.'90 Therefore, a worker who wants to bring a claim
for bad faith against an employer's insurer must now go through the Workers'
Compensation Act and is not permitted to bring a private cause of action through
the Insurance Code.
This legislative action, taken subsequent to Russell, may indicate that the
legislature did not intend to grant a private right of action to third-party claimants
under the Insurance Code. The legislature moved the remedy provided by Russell
out of the Insurance Code and exclusively within the Workers' Compensation
Act.' 9' This action may demonstrate that the legislature was aware of the need for
third-party claimants to bring a cause of action against insurers for bad faith, but
only in certain limited circumstance that they exclusively provided. The counterargument is that the legislature did this for administrative simplicity. It is quite
possible that the legislature thought it prudent to have all of the remedies for a

184. H.R. 44-RCS No. 71, 1st Sess. (N.M. 1999).
185. State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001,
13, 82 P.3d 939, 942. The plain meaning rule "is a tool used by
courts during the course of seeking and effectuating the legislative intent underlying the statute." Id. 12, 82 P.3d
at 942.
186. See supra Part IV.A.2.
187. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001,
14, 82 P.3d at 942.
188. State v. Cleve, 1999-NMSC-017, 15, 980 P.2d 23, 29.
189. See Cruz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 119 N.M. 301, 303, 889 P.2d 1223, 1225 (1995).
190. Id.; see NMSA 1978, § 52-1-28.1 (1990).
191. See Cruz, 119N.M. at 303, 889 P.2d at 1225.
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violation of the Workers' Compensation Act provided for under that statute.
Moreover, this legislative action did not overrule Russell's intended beneficiary
analysis, which was key to the Hovet opinion.192
New Mexico does not have any conclusive legislative history and, thus, the
reasons for the legislature's actions are only speculative. However, these two
actions certainly allow an argument to be made that the legislature's intent was not
to grant a private cause of action to third-party claimants under the Insurance Code.
B. The CaliforniaExperience
New Mexico, although unique, is not the only state that has extended a private
cause of action to a third-party claimant under the Insurance Code. The courts in
California also implemented a holding that allowed a third-party claimant to bring
a private right of action against an insurer for unfair claims practices under its
Insurance Code.
1. Extension of the Right
In Royal Globe InsuranceCo. v. SuperiorCourt,9 ' the plaintiff in a slip and fall
case, after suing the market, joined the store's insurance company claiming a
violation of section 790.03(h)(5) of California's Insurance Code. 9 ' The defendant
insurance company argued that only the California Insurance Commissioner had the
power to enforce the unfair trade practices section of its Insurance Code,' 95 and thus
the plaintiff could not bring suit against the market's insurance company.' 96
However, the court in Royal Globe disagreed, and held that the Unfair Practices Act
"affords a private party, including a third party claimant, a right to sue an insurer
for violating" the unfair trade practices section of the Insurance Code. 97
The court in Royal Globe based its holding on section 790.09 of the California
Insurance Code which "provides that a cease and desist order issued by the
commissioner under the provisions of the act shall not absolve an insurer from 'civil
liability or criminal penalty under the laws of this State arisingout of the methods,
acts orpracticesfound unfair or deceptive.'""19 The court determined that "[t]his
provision appears to afford to private litigants a cause of action against insurers that
commit the unfair acts or practices" as defined in the unfair trade practices section
of the Insurance Code. 199

192. See supra Part ll.B.
193. 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979) (en banc).
194. Id.(interpreting California Insurance Code). CompareCAL. INS. CODE 790.03(h)(5) (West 1993), with
NMSA 1978, § 59A-16-20(E) (1997).
195. Royal Globe, 592 P.2d at 332.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 336. Unlike the New Mexico unfair trade practices section of the Insurance Code, California does
not have a section specifically granting a private right of action against an insurer for violations of unfair trade
practices. Compare CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790-790.10 (West 1993), with NMSA 1978, § 59A-16-30 (1990).
198. Royal Globe, 592 P.2d at 332 (quoting CAL. INS. CODE § 790.09 (West 1993)).
199. Id. Although the court did not have a provision akin to section 59A- 16-30 of the New Mexico Insurance
Code to interpret, and thus did not have a provision with the words "any person," the court still used a similar type
of statutory interpretation in discerning their unfair trade practices statute, CAL. INS. CODE § 790.09 (West 1993).
The court noticed that, throughout the statute, words such as "claimants" and "insured" were used in particular
subdivisions. See CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03 (defining unfair and deceptive acts). The court found that subdivision
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2. Revocation of the Right
In 1988, the California Supreme Court decided Moradi-Shalalv. Fireman'sFund
Insurance Cos.,2tu overruling Royal Globe.2 °1 In its decision, the court illustrated a
number of developments since the Royal Globe ruling and the negative impact of
those developments. 0 2 Of these developments, the court was particularly concerned
with the undesirable social and economic effects of the decision2 3 and the
analytical difficulties the lower courts found with respect to implementation. 2 4
The court in Moradi-Shalalcited numerous scholarly articles that criticized the
Royal Globe opinion." 5 The court found that these articles illustrated "both the
erroneous nature of [its] holding... and the undesirable social and economic effects
of the decision. ",206 The court went on to analyze some of the adverse consequences
that these commentators suggested in their academic criticisms.
The court in Moradi-Shalalnoied these commentators' concern that "the rule in
[Royal Globe] promotes multiple litigation, because its holding contemplates,
indeed encourages, two lawsuits by the injured claimant., 2 7 Other consequences

(h) of that statute "by its own terms extends certain of its protections to claimants, some to insureds, and others to
both claimants and insureds." Id. at 334; see Royal Globe, 592 P.2d at 334.
200. 758 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1988) (en banc).
201. Id. at 63.
202. See id.at 63-68. The court noted that, of the nineteen states which had considered the issue since Royal
Globe, seventeen either implicitly or explicitly rejected its holding. Id.at 63 (citing White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co.,
730 P.2d 1014, 1020-21 (Idaho 1986); Scroggins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 393 N.E.2d 718,723-25 (111. App. Ct. 1979);
Seeman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 322 N.W.2d 35, 40-43 (Iowa 1982); Earth Scientists v. U.S. Fid. & Guar., 619
F. Supp. 1465, 1470-71 (D. Kan. 1985); Tweet v. Webster, 610 F. Supp. 104, 105 (D. Nev. 1985); Patterson v.
Globe Am. Cas. Co., 101 N.M. 541,685 P.2d 396,397-98 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984); A & E Supply Co. v. Nationwide
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 669, 673-75 (4th Cir. 1986) (interpreting Virginia law); Kranzush v. Badger State
Mut. Cas. Co., 307 N.W.2d 256, 269 (Wis. 1981); Young v. Mich. Mut. Ins. Co., 362 N.W.2d 844,846-47 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1984); Morris v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 386 N.W.2d 233,234-38 (Minn. 1986); Lawton v. Great Sw.
Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d 576,581 (N.H. 1978); Farris v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 587 P.2d 1015, 1018-23 (Or. 1978);
D'Ambrosio v. Pa. Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 431 A.2d 966,969-70 (Pa. 1981); Swinton v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 320
S.E.2d 495, 496-97 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984); Russell v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 548 S.W.2d 737, 742 (Tex. App.
1977); Wilder v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 433 A.2d 309, 310 (Vt. 1981); Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
686 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984)). The two states that did recognize the right of a cause of action by
a private individual did not endorse the view that liability could be established for a single violation of the act as
the court in Royal Globe did. Moradi-Shalal,758 P.2d at 63-64 (citing Klaudt v. Flink, 658 P.2d 1065, 1068
(Mont. 1983); Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 280 S.E.2d 252, 259-60 (W. Va. 1981)). While the court
acknowledged that different states used different language in their statutes than that of California, they noted that
the differences were slight and that "the clear consensus of these out-of-state cases strongly calls into question the
validity of our statutory analysis in Royal Globe." Moradi-Shalal,758 P.2d at 64.
203. See Moradi-Shalal,758 P.2d at 66-67.
204. See id. at 67-68.
205. Id. at 64. (citing Glen L. Allen, Insurance Bad Faith Law: The Needfor Legislative Intervention, 13
PAC. L.J. 833, 843 (1982); William J. Casey, Note, Bad Faith: DefiningApplicable Standards in the Aftermath
of Royal Globe v. Superior Court, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 917 (1983); Diana C. White, Comment, Liability
Insurersand Third-PartyClaimants:The Limits ofDuty, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 125,148-51 (1981); Mary Van Osdel
Manning, Comment, Liability to Third Partiesfor Economic Injury: Privity as a Useful Animal, or a Blind
Imitation of the Past, 12 Sw. U. L. REv. 87, 111-18, 125-27 (1981); Joel W. Meskin, Note, Rodriguez v.
Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies, Inc.: An Illustrationofthe ProblemsInherentin the Royal Globe Doctrine,
15 Sw. U. L. REv. 371 (1985); Joan Marion Price, Note, Royal Globe Insurance Company v. Superior Court: Right
to Direct Suit Against an Insurerby a Third-party Claimant, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1161, 1176-87 (1980); Michael
Tencredi, Note, Extending the Liability of Insurersfor Bad Faith Acts: Royal Globe Insurance Company v.
Superior Court, 7 PEPP. L. REv. 777, 791-93 (1980)).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 66.
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that commentators articulated and the court noted were coercion of higher
settlements by plaintiffs,2" 8 the expenditure of judicial resources due to multiple
litigation,20 9 and higher insurance costs because of increased settlements.2 10
Commentators were also concerned that there could become a conflict of interest
between the insurer and the insured because of the insurer's new duty towards the
third-party claimant: "This conflict disrupts the settlement process and may
disadvantage the insured." ''
The court also reviewed the analytical difficulties and confusion lower courts
were having in implementing the Royal Globe holding.2" 2 Specifically, the court in
Moradi-Shalalcharacterized the lower courts as having to make "quasi-legislative"
decisions from the bench.2" 3 However, the biggest problem the court saw with the
Royal Globe holding was that it failed to accurately "define the scope of the... cause
of action."2 4 For instance, the underlying case on appeal in Moradi-Shalalraised
the question whether a judicial determination of liability is required or if a
settlement is conclusive enough to bring an unfair trade practices suit against an
insurer.2" 5 There appeared to be no clear answer to the question as lower courts had
opposing views on the issue.216 The plaintiff in the underlying action on appeal was
also asking for punitive damages, which, while not clearly addressed, appeared to
be appropriately sought.217 These problems allowed for inconsistencies at the trial
court level and little clarification as to the scope of the law.
These were not the only concerns commentators noted with the Royal Globe
holding. As one commentator pointed out, the court's "failure to clarify such issues
as 'the test of liability, standing to sue, the extent of recoverable damages, the
extent to which Royal Globe applies to the various subsections of section 790.03,
and other issues"' made the holding extremely difficult to implement consistently.2 8
In light of these difficulties, the court decided to overrule Royal Globe and only
allow administrative relief by the Insurance Commissioner for violations of the
unfair trade practices section of California's Insurance Code.219
However, due to fairness concerns, the court in Moradi-Shalalonly applied its
holding prospectively. 220 The court determined that, for pending cases, there must
be a judicial determination of liability on the part of the insured, and that

208. Id. (citing Allen, supranote 205, at 851; Price, supranote 205, at 1186-87; Tencredi, supranote 205,
at 790-91).
209. Id. (citing Manning, supra note 205, at 125; Price, supra note 205, at 1186).
210. Id. (citing Allen, supra note 205, at 851; Meskin, supranote 205, at 373; Tencredi, supra note 205, at
792-93).
211. id. at 67.
212. Id. at 67-68.
213. Id. at 67.
214. Id.
215. Id. The court in Royal Globe limited the plaintiff to bringing the unfair trade practices claim until after
the plaintiff brought the negligence claim. See Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 592 P.2d 329, 336-37 (Cal.
1979) (en banc).
216. Moradi-Shalal,758 P.2d at 67.
217. See id. at 60. The trial court never addressed the issue of whether punitive damages were recoverable
because it dismissed the case due to the lack of a conclusion of the negligence action. Id. at 60-61.
218. See id. at 67 (quoting Allen, supra note 205, at 843).
219. See id. at 68.
220. See id. at 69.
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settlements would not be sufficient to justify an action for unfair trade practices
violations. 22 ' Thus, the court restricted the holding for pending cases, correcting
some of the difficulties seen from the Royal Globe holding, albeit only after it
revoked the right of private parties to bring a cause of action in the future.222
C. New Mexico 's Approach
Unlike the court in Royal Globe, the New Mexico Supreme Court drafted its
opinion so as to avoid many of the negative consequences that led the court in
Moradi-Shalalto almost apologetically overrule its holding in Royal Globe. While
the Royal Globe holding was broad, the New Mexico Supreme Court's holding was
limited in scope. 2 23 As discussed above, Royal Globe failed to implement any
guiding principles on how to apply its holding. 224 The court in Royal Globe never
clarified what the "conclusion" of the first case was; therefore, some courts
interpreted "conclusion" as a judicial determination of liability, while others
interpreted "conclusion" as including a settlement.225 The holding was also not clear
as to which sections of the unfair trade practices act were implicated.226 The court
never addressed the damages issue or any of the procedural intricacies that were
sure to conflict with the rules of civil procedure. The absence of any of these
guiding principles from the Royal Globe opinion made matters more difficult for a
continued application of the new rule of law. However, the New' Mexico Supreme
Hovet took great lengths to attempt to define the scope of a "Hovet
Court in
227
claim.

,

The court in Hovet, unlike the court in Royal Globe, has strictly limited the thirdparty cause of action to compulsory automobile insurance. 228 Therefore, only those
claims arising from this specific type of insurance policy can lead to a potential
"Hovet claim." Thus; the widespread economic consequences of this new right are
bound to be far less drastic than those of the broad ruling in Royal Globe which did
not restrict its holding to this particular type of insurance. 22 9 Further, the court in
Hovet clearly indicated that there must be a judicial determination of fault, and,
moreover, any type of settlement between the parties precludes an action for unfair
trade practices violations. 2" This precondition alleviates the problem of conflicting
rulings by lower courts as was seen in the aftermath of Royal Globe.23'
Finally, the court in Hovet refused to allow punitive damages due to a lack of
briefing.23 2 The court stated in dicta that, with a statutory cause of action, the

221.

See id. at 74-75.

222. Id. at 69.
223.

See supra Part IV.A.3.

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

See supra notes 213-217 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 214-216 and accompanying text.
See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
See supra Part IV.A.3.
See Hovet v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2004-NMSC-010, 24, 89 P.3d 69, 76.
See generally Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979) (en banc).
See Hovel, 2004-NMSC-0 10, 125, 89 P.3d at 76.
See Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d 58, 67 (Cal. 1988) (en banc).
See Hovel, 2004-NMSC-0 10, 128, 89 P.3d at 77.
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remedy should be provided within the statute.233 Looking at the statute, it appears
that punitive damages are not contemplated, and only actual damages are
recoverable.2 34 Thus, with these preconditions, the court in Hovet significantly
differentiated its holding from the holding in Royal Globe and much more acutely
defined the third-party cause of action.
Furthermore, Royal Globe was taking a much larger step than the court in Hovet
took, because, at the time, California did not allow any private right of action
against an insurer for violations of the unfair trade practices act.235thHowever, the
New Mexico Legislature, in adopting the Insurance Code, already provided for a
private cause of action in section 59A-1 6-30.236 Thus, the legal community and the
insurance companies doing business in New Mexico were already accustomed to
a private right of action and had accordingly shaped their practices to anticipate
such possibilities.
The court in Hovet did implement several preconditions before a "Hovet claim"
could be brought that will eliminate many of the uncertainties presented by Royal
Globe. However, there are still a host of procedural questions that remain
unanswered.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
A. The Raskob Conflict
The procedure established in Hovet, allowing for an unfair practices claim to be
brought only after a determination of liability, may raise procedural issues
concerning res judicata and collateral estoppel. The doctrine of res judicata23 7
allows a party to a lawsuit to preclude future suits.238 While the court in Martinez
v. Reid2 39 required the suppression of the insurer's identity to avoid prejudice,24 the
court in Raskob v. Sanchez241 provided that a plaintiff may join the defendant's
insurance provider in the underlying negligence claim. 242 Thus, the insurer is still
a party to the first lawsuit if properly joined pursuant to Raskob.243 As a party to the

233. See id.
234. See NMSA 1978, § 59A-1 6-30 (1990) (providing for recovery of"actual damages"); see also infra Part
vI.C.
235. Compare CAL. INS. CODE 790.03 (West 1993), with NMSA 1978, § 59A-16-30 (1990).
236. NMSA 1978, § 59-16-30 (1990) ("Any person ... who has suffered damages as a result of a violation
of [article 16 of the Insurance Code] by an insurer or agent is granted a right to bring an action in district court to
recover actual damages.").
237. See Aguilera v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 2004-NMCA-120, 1 19,99 P.3d 672, 678 ("Res judicata,
or claim preclusion, bars subsequent claims where a previous claim involved (1) identical parties; (2) acting in an
identical capacity; (3) litigating the identical cause of action; and (4) with respect to the same subject matter."
(citing Moffat v. Branch, 2002-NMCA-067, 1 14,49 P.3d 673, 677; Bank of Santa Fe v. Marcy Plaza Assocs.,
2002-NMCA-014, 1 13, 40 P.3d 442, 445)).
238. See Aguilera 2004-NMCA-120, 19, 99 P.3d at 678 (citing Moffat, 2002-NMCA-067, 14,49 P.3d
at 677; Bank of Santa Fe, 2002-NMCA-014, 13, 40 P.3d at 445)).
239. 2002-NMSC-015, 46 P.3d 1237.
240. Id. 126,46 P.3d at 1244.
241. 1998-NMSC-045, 970 P.2d 580.
242. See id. I3, 970 P.2d at 581 (holding that "joinder will be permitted if 1) the coverage was mandated
by law, 2) it benefits the public, and 3) no language of the law expresses an intent to deny joinder").
243. Martinez, 2002-NMSC-015, 1 29,46 P.3d at 1244.

Summer 2005]

NEW MEXICO'S INSURANCE CODE

lawsuit, the insurer may attempt to use res judicata to prevent the plaintiff from
bringing the claim of unfair trade practices. Thus, the benefit of joining a party
pursuant to Raskob may be negated by the possibility of a res judicata attack by the
insurer, now a party to the lawsuit.
"Res judicata bars not only claims that were raised in the prior proceeding, but
also claims that could have been raised." 2" Thus, an insurer may try to argue that
the "Hovet claim" and the negligence claim arose out of the same transaction, and
thus should have been pled together in the original lawsuit.2 45 However, this type
of affirmative defense is unlikely to be successful. Since the court in Hovet
specifically required that there be a judicial determination of liability before a
"Hovet claim" can even be brought, it is unlikely that a court would fault the
plaintiff for not bringing the claim in the negligence action, because the plaintiff
would not be allowed to bring such a claim under the Hovet preconditions.
A more realistic concern may be the use of collateral estoppel by the plaintiff to
prevent certain issues from being relitigated. If the insurer has beenj oined as a party
to the lawsuit, the plaintiff may try to use collateral estoppel to prevent the insurer
from arguing issues that were decided in the negligence action such as liability and
damages. 46
The doctrine of collateral estoppel requires the movant to prove that
(1) the party to be estopped was a party or privity to the prior proceeding, (2) the
cause of action in the present case is different from the cause of action in the
prior proceeding, (3) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding, and
(4) the issue was necessarily determined in the prior proceeding.247
Based on the holding in Hovet, it is likely that the issue of liability would be
estopped from being relitigated because the elements of collateral estoppel appear
to be easily satisfied. 48 The insurer is a party to the first lawsuit, the two causes of
action are different, and finally the issue would be actually litigated and necessarily
determined in the first lawsuit. Based on the preconditions established in Hovet,
these elements should typically be met when an unfair trade practices claim is

244. City of Sunland Park v. Macias, 2003-NMCA-098, 18, 75 P.3d 816,821 (citing State ex rel. Martinez
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 120 N.M. 118, 121, 898 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Ct. App. 1995)).
245. See Three Rivers Land Co., v. Maddoux, 98 N.M. 690, 652 P.2d 240 (1982), overruledon other
grounds by Universal Life Church v. Coxon, 105 N.M. 57, 728 P.2d 467 (1986). The rule governing resjudicata
provides:
(1) When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiff's claim
pursuant to the rules of merger or bar..., the claim extinguished includes all rights of the
plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or
series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.
(2) What factual grouping constitutes a "transaction," and what groupings constitute a
"series," are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether
the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial
unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business
understanding or usage.
Id. at 695, 652 P.2d at 245 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982)).
246. See Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472,474, 745 P.2d 380, 382 (1987) ("Collateral estoppel bars relitigation
of ultimate facts or issues actually and necessarily decided in a prior suit. Under collateral estoppel, or 'issue
preclusion,' the cause of action in the second suit need not be identical with the first suit.").
247. Rex, Inc. v. Manufactured Hous. Comm., 2003-NMCA-134, 1 5, 80 P.3d 470, 473.
248. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
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raised. The plaintiff could not bring the "Hovet action" if the negligence action was
not actually litigated.249 Similarly, the fourth element is met because there must be
a judicial determination of fault on the issue of negligence for the "Hovet action"
to be brought. Therefore, the issue of liability is likely to be binding on the insurer
in the "Hovet action."
However, the plaintiff may also want the jury award to be estopped from being
relitigated and given conclusive effect in the "Hovet action" in order to prove a lack
of good faith on the part of the insurer. In proving good faith, or lack thereof, it may
be necessary to look at the settlement offers made by the insurance company. While
the jury award may not seem relevant to this inquiry-as a good faith settlement
offer would typically be less than that awarded at trial-it may provide a means of
comparison. However, before it can be determined whether the jury award from the
negligence action will be precluded from being relitigated in the "Hovet action," it
must first be determined whether the damages are relevant and thus admissible.
The general rule is that "[r]elevant evidence means evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact of consequence to resolution of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."25 A good faith
effort to settle would take place before the completion of the negligence action;
thus, the ultimate jury verdict does not seem relevant. Due to the space in time
between when a settlement would take place and when the jury verdict is
announced, the evidence of the jury award "may relate to facts too remote in point
of time or matters too far removed from the scene of the transaction to be
admissible."25 ' Moreover, the external factors, such as compassion or prejudice,
which may shape the jury's verdict, are probably not determinative of what a good
faith fair settlement would be before the negligence action commenced.
Furthermore, part of the incentive for an insurer to settle is that it would cost less
than a trial; thus, the jury verdict and a good-faith settlement should differ.
Therefore, the dollar value of a good faith settlement prior to a lawsuit should not
be ascertained from a subjective jury and its verdict. Perhaps it would be more
appropriate to use expert testimony to establish what the insurer should have
offered.2 52

249. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
250. In re Plains Elec. Generation & Transmission Coop., Inc., 106 N.M. 775, 778, 750 P.2d 475,478 (Ct.
App. 1988) (citing Wilson v. Hayner, 98 N.M. 514, 650 P.2d 36 (Ct. App. 1982)).
251. See Williams v. Williams, 71 N.M. 39, 62-63, 376 P.2d 3, 19 (1962).
252. The insurer may attempt to defend against estoppel by arguing that it did not have a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue. See Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472, 745 P.2d 380 (1987).
The trial court is in thebest position to decide whether a party against whom estoppel is asserted
has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate. Neither the offensive or defensive use of collateral
estoppel is to be applied where the record is insufficient to determine what issues were actually
and necessarily determined by prior litigation and it is the burden of the movant invoking the
doctrine of collateral estoppel to introduce sufficient evidence for the court to rule whether the
doctrine is applicable. When the movant has made a prima facie showing, the trial court must
consider the countervailing equities including, but not limited to, prior incentive for vigorous
defense, inconsistencies, procedural opportunities, and inconvenience of forum....
Id. at 476, 745 P.2d at 384 (citations omitted).
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B. Discovery Issues
Another procedural question that Hovet presents is what information parties will
be allowed to discover in a "Hovet action." The New Mexico Rules of Evidence and
Civil Procedure prevent certain information from being discovered.2 53 Most notably,
the rules protect information that is privileged, such as that protected by the
attorney-client privilege,2" 4 or work that was done in anticipation of litigation. 2" A
plaintiff in a "Hovet action" will probably want to discover the insurer's practices
and efforts at settlement. However, this information may come under the protection
of the trade secret privilege256 or as work done in anticipation of litigation.257 While
insurers may waive these privileges if their settlement efforts show that they were
done in good faith, the insurer has the option of keeping this information
confidential.
If the insurer decides to keep the information confidential, asserting the trade
secret privilege, the information will only be disclosed if concealment would tend
to further a fraud or other injustice. 5 ' The settlement practices of the insurer are
obviously quite important in proving a lack of good faith effort in settling, so the
plaintiff could argue that concealment of the settlement practices would tend to
further an injustice
by preventing the plaintiff from discovering evidence necessary
25 9
to prove liability.

253. SeeRules 11-501 to -514 NMRA (enumerating privileges); Rule 1-026(B)NMRA(providing for scope
of discovery).
254. Rule 11-503 NMRA. Subsection (B) of that rule provides:
A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing
confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional
legal services to the client, (1) between the client and the client's lawyer or his lawyer's
representative, or (2) between the client's lawyer and the lawyer's representative, or (3) by the
client or client's lawyer to a lawyer representing another in a matter of common interest, or (4)
between representatives of the client or between the client and a representative of the client, or
(5) between lawyers representing the client.
Rule 11-503(B) NMRA.
255. See Rule 1-026(B)(4) NMRA.
256. See Rule 11-508 NMRA, which provides:
A person has a privilege, which may be claimed by the person or the person's agent or
employee, to refuse to disclose and to prevent others from disclosing a trade secret owned by
the person, if the allowance of the privilege will not tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work
injustice. When disclosure is directed, the court shall take such protective measure as the
interests of the holder of the privilege and of the parties and the furtherance of justice may
require.
257. See Rule 1-026(B)(4) NMRA, which provides:
Subject to the provisions of Subparagraph (5) of this paragraph [dealing with experts], a party
may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under
Subparagraph (1) of this paragraph [dealing with privileged information] and prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's
representative (including the other party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer or
agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the
materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable without undue
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering
discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an
attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
258. See Rule 11-508 NMRA.
259. See id.
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If, on the other hand, the insurer asserts that the settlement information consisted
of materials done in preparation of litigation,260 the plaintiff may have an easier time
getting the settlement practices disclosed. Generally, "[t]he work product rule is not
a privilege, but an immunity protecting from discovery documents and tangible
things prepared by a party or its representative in anticipation of litigation."26' The
first step in asserting this immunity is that the insurance company must establish
that the material was done in anticipation of litigation. There is no neat formula to
determine whether the material complies with this requirement, but generally the
moving party must show "that litigation was 'the driving force' behind the
preparation of"the materials.262 This poses an interesting question: If the settlement
practices were done in good faith, then wouldn't avoiding litigation be the driving
force behind the material? This will be an issue the trial court will have to address,
and the resolution may implicate some fascinating appellate issues.
Assuming the trial court decides that the material was created in anticipation of
litigation, the plaintiff may still be able to get the material disclosed.263 The rule
provides for nearly absolute immunity for work products that are characterized as
"opinion," while only allowing a qualified immunity for other material done in
preparation of litigation.2 4 It will be interesting to see how the courts characterize
settlement practices. On the one hand, if the settlements were done systematically
using empirical evidence, it would be hard to argue that this is an opinion of the
insurer or its attorney. On the other hand, if the settlement practices were
individualized depending on the facts of each case, it seems that the settlement
practices may qualify as an opinion or legal theory. However, assuming that the
settlement practices of the insurer are not considered to be an opinion or legal
theory, the plaintiff would still have to show that there is a substantial need for the
documents and that these documents cannot be obtained through other means
without undue hardship to the plaintiff.265 These tests will likely be met, as the
settlement practices are the essential issue in the case, and the plaintiffwill not have
any other means of access to the settlement practices of the insurance company.
C. Damages
One of the most intangible aspects of the Hovet opinion is that it declines to
address the issue of damages.266 As of now, the court has not extended punitive
damages to a plaintiff in a "Hovet claim., 267 Thus, the only damages that appear to

260. "The party asserting the work product immunity under NMRA i-026(B)(4) bears the burden of
establishing for each document that the rule applies." Hartman v. Texaco Inc., 1997-NMCA-032, 1 20, 937 P.2d
979, 984.
261. Id. 19, 937 P.2d at 984.
262. Id. 21,937 P.2d at 984 (quoting Diamond State Ins. Co. v. Rebel Oil Co., 157 F.R.D. 691,699 (D.
Nev. 1994)).
263. See Rule 1-026(B)(4) NMRA.
264. Hartman, 1997-NMCA-032, 19, 937 P.2d at 984.
265. See Rule 1-026(B)(4) NMRA.
266. See Hovet v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2004-NMSC-010,

28, 89 P.3d 69,77-78; supra Part lV.A (discussing

court's refusal to address the issue of punitive damages due to lack of briefing).
267.

See supra notes 159-160 and accompanying text.
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be recoverable are actual damages. However, the term actual damages is vague and
hard to define:
In New Mexico a party seeking to recover damages has the burden of proving
the existence of injuries and resulting damage with reasonable certainty.
However, the theory of damages is founded on the principle of making the
injured party whole. In computing damages the fact finder is not held to an
inflexible or precise standard; the object is to afford just and reasonable
compensation for the injuries sustained.26
Thus, it will be the burden of the plaintiff to prove actual injuries and the damages
resulting from those injuries.169 However, it may be difficult to determine the types
of injuries and the value of those injuries that are sustained due to an unfair trade
practices violation.
The plaintiff will likely try to prove actual damages of costs incurred due to the
delay in compensation, interest, and fees. First, as Judge Fry noted in her dissent to
Hovet, the trial judge at the negligence action can impose pre-judgment interest on
top of the jury verdict for delays in settlement pursuant to section 56-8-4(B) and the
costs of the plaintiff pursuant to Rule 1-068.27o If this pre-judgment interest is
awarded, some of the damages flowing from delay will be recovered.
Second, section 59A- 16-30 allows for attorney fees to be recovered in the "Hovet
action" upon a showing of willfulness.2"7' However, the attorney's fees from the
negligence action are not mentioned. Although it seems logical that the additional
expense of hiring an attorney to go to trial would be an actual damage, the amount
of the attorney's fees would have to be divided at the point in time where the good
faith settlement should have come. The time before that would not be an actual
damage of the insurer's failure to make a good faith settlement offer. This raises the
additional issue of timing and the problem as to when a good faith settlement should
have come. Again, this is the plaintiff's burden of proof, and, while it does not have
to be mathematically precise, it does have to be more than mere conjecture.27 2
Whatever the plaintiff seeks as actual damages from the failure to effectuate a good
faith settlement, there are bound to be many problems trying to prove the amount
of these damages.
Until these questions are addressed, there does not appear to be much incentive
to even bring a "Hovet action," as the damages do not appear to be worth chasing.
The problems in proving any damages that will result in a significant award will
have to be considered by the plaintiff before filing a "Hovet action." Furthermore,
the unresolved problems with the scope of discovery may create a lack of incentive

268. Abbinett v. Fox, 103 N.M. 80, 86, 703 P.2d 177, 183 (Ct. App. 1985) (citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
269. Damages has two aspects. There must be proof that damages resulted-the damage resulting
from breach of contract must be of a kind and character susceptible of proof. There must be
proof of the amount of damages-while uncertainty as to amount will not preclude recovery,
still the amount allowed must be subject to reasonable ascertainment.
Bank of N.M. v. Rice, 78 N.M. 170, 177, 429 P.2d 368, 375 (1967) (citations omitted).
270. See Hovet, 2004-NMSC-010, 41, 89 P.3d at 80 (Fry, J., dissenting).
271. NMSA 1978, § 59A-16-30(B)(1990).
272. See supranote 270 and accompanying text.

678

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 35

to pursue what may be a small amount of damages. Even assuming that the issue of
liability and the jury award are collaterally estopped from being relitigated, the
concerns of damages and discovery still may tend to outweigh the benefit to
plaintiffs of issue preclusion. The most realistic impact that the holding appears to
have is that it may create an incentive for large insurance companies to offer a little
more during settlement negotiations because of the possibility of litigating multiple
suits-a commendable policy. However, at least until the holding in Hovet is further
developed, the current state of the law appears to be similar to that prior to Hovet
because of the limitations and disincentives of bringing suit.

